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Abstract 
Regional disparities in Central and Eastern Europe rose substantially after 1990. Still, prima 
facie evidence of beta-convergence is often found in the CEE data. To reconcile this apparent 
paradox, we sketch out and test empirically a hybrid model of regional growth that draws 
on the regional Kuznets curve and incorporates aspects of cumulative causation and 
neoclassical convergence. In both CEE and the ‘old’ EU15, regional convergence is 
strongly linked to the level of national development, non-linearly. But while in the EU15 
convergence speeds-up at intermediate/high levels of development, in CEE we find 
divergence at intermediate levels of national development and no significant return 
to convergence thereafter. Although this may show that overall development levels 
are not sufficient yet to mobilise regional convergence, it is also possible that non-
convergence is attributable to centripetal forces instigated by the process of 
transition. 
 
Keywords: regional growth; convergence; regional Kuznets curve; Central and Eastern 
Europe 
JEL Codes: O11, O18, R11, R15  
 
 
1. Introduction  
Regional disparities in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have risen sharply 
over the last two decades. With them, strong patterns of polarisation emerged, as increasing 
openness and economic-political integration, stimulated by the process of transition, have 
not been equally beneficial across space. Besides their policy relevance, these developments 
are particularly important for academic inquiry, as they challenge simple concepts of 
convergence and instantaneous equilibration (Monastiriotis and Petrakos, 2010), bringing to 
the fore some fundamental theoretical questions. Is the process of development inherently 
uneven? Is, inversely, convergence an automatic process driven by the properties of the 
                                                 
#
 An earlier version of this paper was presented in the 2011 “Workshop on Inequality and Regional 
Growth and Cohesion”. I am thankful to conference participants for useful comments and 
suggestions. A special acknowledgement goes to Alejandra Castrodad-Rodriguez for the many 
discussions that helped shape the research reported in this paper. 
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production technology (diminishing returns)? Or is growth an endogenously-driven 
cumulative process, whereby leading economies, boosted by their past performance, are 
able to maintain and enhance their advantages over less developed ones? And are processes 
of convergence and divergence conditioned on the level of national development and the 
national political-economic context?  
In recent decades, the study of these questions has been dominated by the so-called 
‘convergence hypothesis’. Based on the Solow one-sector growth model under the 
assumptions of a common technology, diminishing returns and no systematic external 
shocks (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1991), the convergence hypothesis asserts that economies 
starting from higher development levels experience slower growth rates, so that less 
developed economies eventually catch-up. Although more recent contributions have sought 
to move beyond the simplicity of this hypothesis (e.g., by examining distributional dynamics, 
club-formation and spatial dependence – Rey and Janikas, 2005, Dall’erba et al, 2008 – or by 
looking at the role of local-specific variables such as entrepreneurship and cultural diversity 
– Audretsch and Keilbach, 2005, Bellini et al, 2009), the macroeconomic analysis of regional 
growth, with few exceptions, is still very much rooted in the convergence hypothesis.  
Following, much of the empirical analysis of regional disparities in CEE has also been within 
this framework, typically finding evidence of neoclassical convergence either in absolute 
terms or in parallel with the formation of convergence clubs (Dall’erba et al, 2008; Artelaris 
et al, 2010; Smetkowski and Wójcik, 2012). Curiously, studies adopting alternative analytical 
frameworks, such as the Kaldor-Verdoorn model of cumulative causation under the 
presence of increasing returns (Kaldor, 1970; McCombie and de Ridder, 1984), find evidence 
pointing to the opposite direction, towards cumulative divergence.  
It is of course very difficult to subscribe simultaneously to both analytical processes. 
Neoclassical convergence implies the presence of constant returns to scale, resulting in 
catching-up by lagging regions as the growth rates of more advanced regions slow down. In 
turn, the cumulative causation thesis contents that more advanced regions maintain higher 
rates of growth as they capitalise on their productivity advantages and increasing returns to 
scale. Simple inspection of the evolution of regional incomes and productivities in the CEE 
countries confirms the presence of such divergence tendencies. It is thus puzzling that the 
‘convergence hypothesis’ is still empirically validated by the data.  
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Against this background, this paper sets out to examine in a comparative way the process of 
regional growth in CEE linking it to the process of national development in a fashion more 
akin to the so-called ‘regional Kuznets curve’, developed by Williamson (1965). Our aim is 
not to provide a causal explanation of regional growth but rather a description of the 
regional growth process that moves beyond the polarity of the convergence-divergence 
debate and frames it within the context of national development.  
Our empirical analysis supports this analytical departure. Consistent with previous findings, 
we find evidence of both convergence and cumulative causation, in both the east (CEE) and 
the west (EU15). We show that convergence-divergence tendencies exist in parallel with a 
process of polarisation, especially in the CEE, whereby “convergence at the bottom” 
(amongst low-to-medium productivity regions) takes place in conjunction with a “separation 
from the top” (for the more advanced regions). We subsequently examine the interaction 
between regional growth and national development, through an adapted formulation of the 
regional Kuznets curve, and find the process of convergence to follow a non-linear path 
along levels of national development in both samples, but to be weaker and qualitatively 
different in the CEE, where levels of development are generally lower and where the 
national context is influenced uniquely by the process of post-communist transition and 
European integration.  
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we offer a brief 
review of the literature on regional convergence and the evolution of regional disparities in 
CEE and in Europe more broadly. Section 3 examines the evidence concerning the patterns 
of regional growth in CEE (and, comparatively in the EU15) through both a descriptive and an 
exploratory regression analysis, with emphasis on processes of convergence, divergence and 
polarisation. Drawing on the notion of the regional Kuznets curve and linking it to the 
process of transition, in section 4 we move on to propose an alternative theoretical 
description of the growth process and investigate it empirically. We discuss the implications 
of our results in the concluding section. 
 
 
2. Regional growth in CEE and the wider national-development context  
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Descriptive studies examining the extent and evolution of regional disparities in the CEE 
countries have found consistently that these have grown significantly over the last two 
decades. The rise in inequalities has been evident from the early stages of transition 
(Petrakos 1996; Römisch, 2003), but it continued throughout the period and in some cases 
intensified (Ezcurra et al, 2007; Kallioras and Petrakos, 2010). There is broad consensus in 
the literature, largely attributing these developments to the significant geographical and 
sectoral reallocation that has taken place in CEE over the last two decades. On the one hand, 
there is a notable shift of industrial activity towards metropolitan regions and regions 
bordering the EU (Petrakos and Economou, 2002; Iara and Traistaru, 2003), stimulated partly 
by the self-selected inflow of foreign investments in these areas (Altomonte and Resmini, 
2002; Tondl and Vuskic, 2003). Trade integration also played a role in this, by favouring 
regions with significant specialisations and agglomeration economies, relative concentration 
of skilled labour and vibrant product demand (Traistaru et al, 2003; Resmini, 2007). On the 
other hand, the literature identifies a process of structural change across sectoral lines, both 
in terms of internal structures (sectoral compositions) and external competitiveness (trade 
specialisations) (Resmini, 2003; Niebuhr and Schlitte, 2009; Kallioras and Petrakos, 2010). 
Analyses along these lines confirm the inherent link between spatial and structural 
restructuring, finding that regions which have successfully restructured and thus benefited 
most from integration are those located closer to the EU borders and to metropolitan areas 
or large agglomerations.  
Despite this general trend, econometric studies following the convergence approach often 
find evidence of convergence, at least in cross-country – cross-regional analyses (indicating 
regional convergence across the CEE space but not necessarily within each CEE country). 
Herz and Vogel (2003) use data for 31 regions across the CEECs and find evidence of 
divergence in the early transition period and of conditional convergence more recently. 
Using Eurostat data and examining cross-national and cross-regional convergence across the 
CEE, Niebuhr and Schlitte (2009; at the NUTS2 level for the period 1995-2000) and Paas et al 
(2007; at the NUTS3 level for 1995-2002) find evidence of regional divergence or stability 
within countries but of fast cross-national convergence, resulting in an overall slow 
convergence of regional incomes at the supra-national level. Using the same database in a 
simple neoclassical framework, Petrakos et al (2005a) also find evidence of convergence. 
Similar are the results obtained by Del Bo et al (2010), who use NUTS2-level Cambridge 
Econometrics data in a spatial econometrics framework and find evidence of both 
conditional and (marginally) unconditional convergence across the CEE regions. Evidence of 
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convergence is also obtained in country-specific studies (e.g., Totev, 2008, for Bulgaria; 
Banerjee and Jarmuzek, 2010, for Slovakia).  
In an analysis that departs somewhat from the neoclassical approach, Petrakos et al (2005b) 
find simultaneous evidence of short-run divergence and long-run convergence, with the 
level of disparities moving pro-cyclically along an overall convergent trend. Kallioras (2010) 
shows that convergence trends are conditioned on the size of the regional economies, 
pointing to the possibility of club convergence. Direct evidence for this, with strong regional 
convergence within, and persistent divergence across clubs, has been offered recently by 
Artelaris et al (2010; for within-country clubs) and earlier by Fischer and Stirböck (2006; for 
cross-country clubs). In a detailed study along these lines, which also examines the stability 
of convergence clubs across the CEE countries, Smetkowski and Wójcik (2012) find club-
membership to be rather persistent and within-club convergence to exist together with 
spatial polarisation at wider scales.  
Similar results are found more generally in the literature on regional growth in Europe. 
Evidence of club convergence in the ‘old’ EU member states has been obtained widely (see, 
inter alia, Canova, 2004; Corrado et al, 2005; Fischer and Stirbock, 2006; Dall’erba et al, 
2008), while more recent contributions highlight the role of spatial processes (proximity, 
concentration), both for club-formation (spatial heterogeneity) and for the overall speed of 
convergence (see, for example, Lopez-Bazo et al, 2004; Ertur et al, 2006; Egger and 
Pfaffermayr, 2006; Arbia et al, 2008; Rey and Le Gallo, 2009; Arbia et al, 2010 – see also the 
discussion in Fingleton and Lopez-Bazo, 2006). The importance of spatial processes has been 
also analysed in empirical studies employing the Verdoorn Law equation. Using this, 
Fingleton and McCombie (1998), Dall’erba et al (2008), Angeriz et al (2008), and others find 
evidence of increasing returns – and thus of a tendency for regional divergence and/or club 
convergence – across EU regions.  
Despite the important advances made in this literature, the analysis of processes of club-
formation and convergence is largely separated from the national (and supra-national) 
context of the regional economies. Indeed, if we are to put aside the studies that look at 
questions of regional restructuring within the context of transition, there is only a handful of 
studies that examine the issue of convergence-divergence in relation to the national-
development context. In his historical study of regional convergence in Europe, Tondl (1997) 
found that this was speedier in the 1950s and 1960s, slowed down during the 1970s, and 
recovered somewhat in the 1980s – suggesting that the speed of convergence may well be 
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pro-cyclical (in relation to national growth). In turn, Geppert and Stephan (2008) examine 
regional convergence in relation to the process of economic integration in Europe and find 
integration to be associated to cross-regional convergence across countries, albeit with 
increasing spatial concentration and regional disparities within countries. More specifically 
on the issue of development, Gennaioli et al (2013) develop a theoretical model where the 
speed of convergence is an inverse function of factor mobility frictions. The authors claim 
that such frictions are higher in less developed economies, thus predicting higher rates of 
regional convergence as national economic development progresses. Employing a different 
methodological approach that looks at the issue of polarisation rather than 
disparity/convergence per se, Ezcurra and Pascual (2007) find that the distribution of 
regional incomes becomes less polarised (along a non-linear path) as levels of national GDP 
per capita increase. A similar effect (an inverted-J path) has been found in the study of 
Petrakos et al (2011), albeit for the case of regional levels of development and in the context 
of a neoclassical convergence model.  
 
 
3. Regional growth through the prism of convergence and divergence  
3.1. Patterns of inequality and polarisation  
Our empirical investigation uses data on regional labour productivity, defined as gross value-
added per employee, covering the period 1990-2008. In parts of the analysis we also use 
data on regional GDP (GVA plus net transfers) and GDP per capita (resident population). We 
use regional data at the NUTS3 level, covering 1,276 regions across Europe, 190 of which are 
located in the CEE.1 Our focus is with the analysis of regional productivity, as this is the 
relevant variable for the two main theoretical approaches on the issue of regional growth 
(neoclassical convergence and the Kaldor-Verdoorn Law).  
We start our analysis by examining the evolution of regional disparities in labour 
productivity at the country level and for each of the two groups of countries (CEE and EU15). 
Figure 1 plots the coefficient of variation of regional labour productivity across the 25 
                                                 
1
 The CEE countries in our sample are the 10 post-communist New Member States of the EU that 
acceded in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Cyprus and Luxemburg are excluded from our analysis. 
Nominal data have been deflated and expressed in constant 2000 euros. All data are from the 
Cambridge Econometrics European Regional Database (http://www.camecon.org).  
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countries of our sample (summary measures of disparity and polarisation are presented in 
the Appendix). As can be seen, regional disparities have increased in the majority of the CEE 
countries. Among the countries in this group, only one (Slovenia) shows a clear and lasting 
trend of declining disparities (sigma-convergence). Disparities in Poland have been rather 
stable and in Romania and Bulgaria they have alternated trends, but all other CEE countries 
have experienced almost continuously rising regional disparities. The picture is generally 
different in the EU15 sample, were disparities have remained rather stable throughout the 
period and in many cases have declined over time. Thus, whereas in the EU15 there is some 
mild evidence of sigma-convergence, in the CEE sample the evidence rather strongly 
suggests a widening of disparities at least at the national level – with the coefficient of 
variation almost doubling in some cases (Czech Republic, Estonia).  
 
Figure 1. Evolution of regional disparities in labour productivity across  EU countries 
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Note: Coefficients of variation of the within-country distribution of labour productivity; author’s 
calculations.  
  
This picture is reproduced when examining regional disparities not within countries but 
within each of the two groups (CEE and EU15). In the CEE, disparities in regional labour 
productivity rose sharply during the 1990s with the coefficient of variation across the sample 
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rising from around 0.33 in 1990 to 0.58 in 1999 and stabilising somewhat thereafter but 
remaining at very high levels (0.55 in 2004-08 – see Appendix). In contrast, disparities in the 
EU15 group were declining in the 1990s and rose only modestly in the 2000s (from 0.21 to 
0.23). More interestingly, the evolution of the distribution of regional labour productivities 
was also very different across the two groups. As is shown in Figure 2, the distribution is 
strictly uni-modal and very leptokurtic in the EU15 sample, at least since the mid-1990s, and 
has remained so up to 2008, despite some widening of the distribution in more recent years. 
In contrast, the CEE distribution saw a significant widening over time, becoming bi-modal at 
least since the late-1990s and increasingly skewed to the right. Undoubtedly, this evolution 
shows a tendency of polarisation in the CEE sample, with values around the median (10.6) 
having very low densities, and a significant number of regions having values over twice the 
median.  
 
Figure 2. Evolution of the cross-national distribution of regional labour productivity 
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Notes: author’s calculations. 
 
It thus seems evident that the evolution of regional disparities in both the CEECs and the CEE 
region at large has been notably different from that of the EU15, as the CEE sample is 
characterised not only by widening disparities (sigma-divergence) but also by a relative 
polarisation in the distribution of labour productivities across regions; while, in contrast, 
regional disparities in the EU15 are much lower, generally non-rising and distributed around 
a single mode. Next we examine how these patterns are captured in an econometric analysis 
that draws on the two dominant models of neoclassical convergence and cumulative 
causation typically employed in the literature.  
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3.2. Testing convergence and cumulative divergence  
As is well known, the empirical formulation of the convergence hypothesis makes regional 
growth a function of initial regional incomes, as follows: 
0,10, )()(  titi lybbly      (1) 
where y is the log of output, l is log employment, i and t index regions and time, respectively, 
and b1<0, reflecting catch-up convergence. In turn, the cumulative causation hypothesis is 
typically examined using the Kaldor-Verdoorn equation (Kaldor, 1970), which makes 
productivity growth (typically, in manufacturing) a function of total output growth:  
titi qccly ,10, )()(      (2) 
where q stands for total output in the economy. The coefficient c1 in eq.2 is supposed to 
capture the presence of increasing returns to scale and thus of tendencies for (cumulative) 
divergence. Although there is no direct relation between equations 1 and 2, empirically c1>0 
in eq.2 implies that b1>0 in eq.1 (see Cibuskiene and Butkus, 2007 for relevant discussion). 
We examine this in Table 1. 
As can be seen in cols.1-2, the convergence hypothesis is well validated by the data as we 
find strong evidence of convergence in both the CEE and the EU15.2 Convergence is slower in 
the CEE and statistically much weaker, resulting in a differential in the so-called ‘half-life 
condition’ of just over two years (8.3 versus 10.4), although the overall fit of the regression is 
lower in the much-bigger EU15 sample suggesting a greater differentiation in regional 
growth trajectories in this sample.  
 
Table 1. Neoclassical convergence and the Kaldor-Verdoorn law 
 Neoclassical 
convergence  
Kaldor-Verdoorn 
model 
Nested model Nested model with 
group effects 
 EU15 CEE EU15 CEE EU15 CEE EU15 CEE 
Productivity 
(t-1) 
-0.084* -0.067*   -0.058* -0.074* -0.068* -0.087* 
(0.003) (0.006)   (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) 
Output 
growth 
  0.712* 0.551* 0.658* 0.568* 0.649* 0.565* 
  (0.014) (0.037) (0.012) (0.033) (0.012) (0.033) 
High-p/y 
status 
      0.014* 0.032* 
      (0.001) (0.005) 
Constant 0.326* 0.182* -0.012* -0.069* 0.203* 0.216* 0.238* 0.321* 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.002) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) (0.010) (0.019) 
Year FE 39.17* 36.81* 60.96* 36.24* 53.74* 42.13* 55.03* 44.00* 
                                                 
2
 The regressions in columns 1 and 2 control for country and time fixed effects. The result, however, is 
universally consistent across alternative specifications (regional FEs, random effects, etc). 
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Country FE 153.76* 53.86* 32.89* 31.50* 134.21* 66.69* 152.68* 72.20* 
Obs 20,402 3,176 20,400 3,176 20,400 3,176 20,400 3,176 
Regions 1,086 190 1,086 190 1,086 190 1,086 190 
R
2
 0.173 0.239 0.407 0.366 0.461 0.420 0.468 0.428 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-corrected standard errors in parentheses (using the Davidson and 
MacKinnon, 1993 correction). Asterisks (*) denote significance at the 1% level.  
 
Despite this – admittedly, basic – confirmation of the ‘convergence hypothesis’, however, 
when testing the Kaldorian specification (cols.3-4) we obtain a positive and statistically 
significant effect for regional output growth. This is puzzling, as it clearly suggests a process 
of cumulative divergence in contrast to the inference drawn from cols.1-2.3 Adding to this is 
the fact that, as with the convergence coefficient, the so-called Verdoorn coefficient is also 
larger (and statistically more significant) in the EU15 than in the CEE sample – by some 30%. 
These results remain robust when we nest the two specifications (cols.5-6): in both groups 
of countries we obtain simultaneous evidence of neoclassical convergence and cumulative 
causation. In the EU15 the convergence and Verdoorn coefficients decline (by 30% and 8% 
respectively) and in the CEE they rise (by 11% and 3%, respectively), but in all cases they 
maintain their high statistical significance.  
In cols.7-8 we examine whether the simultaneous evidence of convergence and cumulative 
causation may be driven by different growth trajectories among different sub-groups of 
regions. Specifically, it is possible that a group of regions – presumably the most advanced 
ones – benefit more strongly by increasing returns (thus producing a positive Verdoorn 
coefficient in the pooled sample), while convergence takes place among the regions 
exhibiting low-to-medium levels of productivity. The results only partly support this 
hypothesis. The coefficient on the dummy for high-productivity regions4 is positive and 
statistically significant in both samples, suggesting that regional growth is ceteris paribus 
higher in more advanced regions (by 1.4 percentage points in the EU15 and notably more, by 
                                                 
3
 The specification of eq.2 has received a number of criticisms in the literature (Mamgain, 1999; 
Angeriz et al, 2008), concerning its culpability to spurious correlation (due to simultaneity) and its 
implicit assumption of a constant capital/labour ratio (Harris and Liu, 1999; Castiglione, 2011). 
Nevertheless, the evidence of a positive Verdoorn coefficient is obtained consistently across many 
alternative specifications (results available upon request) and thus seems very robust. Evidence of 
cumulative divergence has also been obtained for the CEE regions from a specification drawing on the 
Myrdalian notion of circular causation (Monastiriotis, 2013).  
4
 We have classified these as those regions that have belonged to the top-25% of their national 
distribution of regional productivities for each and every year in our sample. The results are very 
similar under alternative definitions, including (a) replacing the 75
th
 percentile with the median, the 
mean or the national value; and (b) varying the eligibility from ‘all years’ to ‘majority of years’ or ‘a 
subset of years’. 
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3.2pp, in the CEE). Further, the convergence coefficients increase in both samples (both by 
around 17%), suggesting that convergence is indeed speedier “at the bottom”. However, in 
both EU15 and CEE, the Verdoorn coefficients remain practically unchanged, implying that 
this effect is not driven by the process of divergence (and club-formation) “at the top”.  
 
 
4. The regional Kuznets curve and the process of transition  
4.1. Theoretical considerations 
Analytically, both theoretical streams examined so far see the process of regional growth as 
conditioned on the regional development context – negatively for neoclassical convergence 
and positively for the cumulative causation approach. The puzzle of the obtained evidence 
pointing simultaneously to both convergence (Table 1) and divergence/polarisation (Table 1 
and Figures 1 and 2), and the fact that the former appears stronger in the EU15 sample, 
where levels of development are significantly higher, while the latter is stronger in the less 
developed CEE region, invites us to consider the possibility that the process of convergence 
itself may also be conditional – this time on the context of national development, possibly 
along a non-linear path, whereby inequalities first rise, as economies start to grow out from 
initially low levels of development, and then subside, as national economies advance.  
This is essentially the process described by Williamson’s (1965) ‘regional Kuznets curve’ 
(henceforth, RKC). According to this, regional disparities, originally low for low levels of 
development, rise sharply as the process of national development accelerates and economic 
activity concentrates to take advantage of scale and agglomeration economies. In later 
phases, as connectivity across space improves (e.g., through infrastructure investment or 
declining transportation costs) and congestion diseconomies start biting, new growth 
opportunities emerge in more peripheral regions and disparities start subsiding.5 Formally, 
the RKC hypothesis makes regional disparities a non-linear function of national 
development: 
                                                 
5
 Similar arguments have been developed more recently also in the urban economics literature 
(Henderson et al, 2001; Duranton and Puga, 2004). Further, as we saw earlier, this process of 
intensifying regional convergence at more advanced stages of national development is also supported 
empirically in the scant literature on the topic (Ezcurra and Pascual, 2007; Gennaioli et al, 2013). 
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2
210 )()()( tNNtNNtii lydlyddlyVar     (3) 
where the subscript N indexes the national level and d1>0, d2<0. Studies drawing on this 
formulation have provided evidence in favour of the RKC (Barrios and Strobl, 2006; Ezcurra 
and Rapun, 2006; Francois and Rojas-Romagosa, 2008) without examining specifically the 
growth process at the regional level. It is however possible to express this relationship in 
terms of regional growth in a way more consistent with the neoclassical convergence model.  
Imagine an initial stage of very low development nationally, where the whole economy is 
employed in the production of a set of goods (say, agriculture) under constant returns to 
scale and thus all regions have similar levels of productivity. In this economy, all regions 
grow at a very similar pace, at or around the national growth rate, and small idiosyncratic 
deviations from the national level of productivity are ‘corrected’ instantaneously resulting in 
very high observed speeds of convergence. In algebraic form, 
1,2,10, )()()(  titNti lyzlyzzly    (4) 
with z0≈0, z1≈1 and z2<0. As the national economy grows and labour productivity increases, 
conditions emerge for the adoption of new technologies and/or the introduction of new 
products6, some of which will be characterised by increasing returns to scale. Idiosyncratic 
deviations at the regional level will ensure that not all regions reach this stage 
simultaneously. Those that do so first, will obtain an advantage which, due to the nature of 
the new technology (increasing returns), will be cumulative. Higher profitability and 
productivity gains in these regions and perhaps also stronger consumption externalities 
(agglomeration effects) will shift investment towards them, instigating a process of regional 
divergence, while at the same time pushing upwards the average (national) level of 
development. In this instance national growth will be a less accurate descriptor of regional 
growth (so that z1 becomes statistically less significant
7) and neoclassical convergence will be 
reversed (so that z20, or at least z2
B>z2
A, if the lagging regions continue to converge – where 
A and B index stages of development).  
Provided that the less well-off regions are not permanently prevented from the adoption of 
the new technology, and in the absence of any systematic shocks favouring the more 
                                                 
6
 For example, technology products whose production is characterised by high fixed costs and thus 
requires a certain level of productivity so as for production to be profitable.  
7
 Essentially, whether z1 becomes greater or smaller than 1 will depend on the shape of the 
distribution of regional growth rates and the relative size of the leading regions. In this case, z0 will 
also now be different, as we depict later in eq.4’.   
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advanced regions, with the passage of time the lagging regions will also move to the new 
production regime (that is, as long as they continue to grow while in stage B). This will 
instigate a return to the process of convergence, so that z2
C<0 (where C stands for the new 
stage of national development).8 Naturally, the picture will be different if in the course of 
stage B some forces emerge to perpetuate the agglomeration advantage of the leading 
regions. In line with endogenous growth theory, such forces may well be endogenous – for 
example, due to the embeddedness of human capital into physical labour or due to a 
positive correlation between levels of productivity and the incidence of positive technology 
shocks. However, such forces may also be exogenous – if for example a national shock 
favours systematically high-productivity regions. As we discussed in the first part of this 
paper, the post-communist transition experienced by the CEE countries may well represent 
such a national shock that may have favoured the more advanced regions, selectively 
directing there new technologies embodied in foreign investments and reinforcing their 
agglomeration advantages. In contrast, in more advanced economies with more developed 
credit markets, lower political uncertainties and overall risks and better institutional and 
physical infrastructure to facilitate mobility, the conditions for the emergence of centrifugal 
forces, and thus of regional convergence, will be stronger.9  
We can thus identify two alternative paths within stage C. In path C1, agglomeration forces 
are persistent and possibly reinforced, resulting in continuous divergence (z2
C10, so that the 
convergence path is monotonic but not necessarily concave); while in path C2 agglomeration 
forces die out and convergence re-emerges (z2
C2<0, so that the convergence path is concave 
but non-monotonic (hump-shaped)) – until perhaps a new technological shock starts the 
convergence-divergence cycle again. We can represent these trajectories in algebraic form 
by extending eq.4 as follows: 
1,2,10, )()()(   ti
S
S
tN
S
SS
ti lyzDlyzDzDly   (4’) 
where DS is a set of binary dummies indexing stages of national development (S={A, B, C1, 
C2}). Drawing on our discussion, we expect z2 to follow a non-linear (initially, hump-shaped) 
path along stages of development and the statistical significance of z1 to decline over time, at 
least initially. We moreover expect that for higher levels of development (stage C), the 
                                                 
8
 This requires that, despite the increasing returns technology, the returns to any individual factor of 
production remain diminishing (otherwise the first-mover advantage becomes permanent).  
9
 Similar developments are described in some models within the NEG tradition (see Krugman, 1991 
and, in particular, Ottaviano and Puga, 1998, and Puga, 1999).  
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coefficient z2 to be more negative in the EU15 sample and (more) positive in the CEE sample. 
We examine the validity of these predictions next.  
 
4.2. Empirical results 
To perform our analysis we need to identify different stages, or thresholds, of development 
across which the direction and intensity of convergence may differ. This is not a 
straightforward task, especially as it is not practically possible to derive a universal definition 
of ‘stages of development’ across our two samples.10 Opting thus for the use of group-
specific definitions of ‘stages’, we were confronted with a number of options, ranging from 
adopting an exogenous classification, either ad hoc or by drawing on existing international 
classifications, to deriving our groups endogenously, e.g., through cluster analysis. For our 
analysis we favoured a simpler classification method, largely due to its simplicity, splitting 
each of the two samples (EU15 and CEE) on the basis of the treciles (33rd and 66th 
percentiles) of the group-specific distributions of national incomes (GDP per capita).11 This is 
convenient, as it splits each sample independently into three group-specific ‘stages of 
development’, in line with our theoretical stages A, B and C, and avoids the practical 
problems of a universal definition of stages of development. 
Nevertheless, we also developed an alternative classification, driven there by our early 
findings and the experimentation with other classification schemes. This was as follows. 
First, we applied a linear scale transformation (distance from minimum divided by range) to 
standardise the distribution of GDP per capita within each group. We then derived trecile 
thresholds from these standardised distributions and merged them, producing five 
distinctive categories (‘stages’: from the lowest trecile of the CEE distribution to the top 
trecile of the EU15 distribution), and applied subsequently these thresholds to the two 
standardised distributions separately. As these thresholds did not overlap (i.e., the 33rd 
percentile of the EU15 distribution was above the 66th percentile of the CEE distribution), in 
effect this classification is identical to the simple treciles classification above, with the only 
                                                 
10
 National incomes differ substantially across the EU15 and CEE countries and thus the income 
distributions of the two country groups hardly overlap. Besides this, given the specificity of the CEE 
transition context, it is in some respects questionable whether east-west differences in GDP per 
capita actually reflect differences in levels of development.  
11
 We have replicated the analysis for other thresholds (quartiles and quintiles – results available upon 
request) but the patterns were broadly consistent with those derived from the treciles and overall 
less informative than the alternative method described next in the text. 
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difference that, additionally, ‘stage C’ (the upper trecile) of the CEE distribution and ‘stage A’ 
(lower trecile) of the EU15 distribution are split each into three sub-stages. This provides us 
with a more detailed picture for the ‘early’ stages of development in the EU15 and for the 
‘late’ stages of development in the CEE which, as we will see, helps unveil some very 
interesting patterns.  
It should be noted that the analytical approach and modelling strategy followed here (e.g., 
modelling regional growth as a function of national growth; creating a discontinuous space 
by splitting into ‘stages’) do not allow us to incorporate in our analysis an examination of 
processes of spatial dependence (lag, error, or both) – although relevant tools have recently 
been developed also for the case of panel data (Baltagi and Li, 2006; Kapoor et al, 2007; 
Anselin et al, 2008; Elhorst, 2009).12 Spatial association processes are of course undoubtedly 
important in the process of regional growth, both analytically and empirically (Fingleton and 
López-Bazo, 2006; Arbia, 2006; Dall’erba et al, 2008; Rey and Le Gallo, 2009). Given, 
however, the primary focus of our analysis on the role played by the national 
growth/development context, the examination of these is rather beyond the scope of this 
paper – but it is very much something to consider for future research.  
We start our analysis by estimating the model specified in eq.4’ using the simple three-stage 
classification (Table 2). As can be seen in columns 1-2, the national growth variable is highly 
significant and – consistent with the predictions made earlier – at ‘early’ stages of 
development it is much closer to 1, especially in CEE, and notably more significant 
statistically than in later stages. The stage-specific fixed-effects are also very significant, 
especially in the EU15 sample, in line with our assumption that z0 will be different across 
stages of national development. In contrast, the results concerning the intensity of 
convergence confirm only partially our earlier predictions. In stage 1, both samples produce 
negative and statistically significant convergence coefficients. In the CEE, the coefficient 
declines substantially in stage 2, becoming statistically not different from zero, and turns 
positive at stage 3, showing slow but statistically significant divergence. If we are to interpret 
our empirical stages as accurate reflections of the theoretical stages discussed earlier, then 
                                                 
12
 Omitting a significant spatial lag can produce bias in the parameter estimates; while not taking 
account of a significant spatial error process may lead to biased standard errors. Often, however, 
these biases concern the imputed speed of convergence and not the direction or overall significance 
of the convergence coefficient, thus not altering significantly the substantive interpretation of the 
process under study. For example, Arbia et al (2008), using data for a selection of EU regions, 
compare the performance of different estimation methods on the standard neoclassical convergence 
model and find that “the beta parameter is always negative [and significant] and has a quite small 
range regardless of the specification chosen” (p.220).  
 16 
we should conclude that the convergence-divergence path followed in the CEE corresponds 
to the trajectory described by C1 in our earlier discussion (persistent divergence). However, 
as the convergence coefficient in stage 2 is clearly non-positive, it is also possible that the 
estimate of stage 3 simply captures our theoretical stage B (i.e., that stages 1 and 2 are both 
‘early’ stages of development), making it uncertain as to whether the CEE regions are 
following a divergent or a hump-shaped path.   
 17 
Table 2. Regional growth and stages of economic development  
 
Eq.4’ z1=0 1994-2006 Within countries Five stages 
 
CEE EU15 CEE EU15 CEE EU15 CEE EU15 CEE EU15 
Nat’l growth           
Stage 1 0.995*** 1.174***   0.997*** 1.520*** 0.990*** 1.168*** 0.994*** 1.098*** 
 
(34.13) (33.54)   (25.03) (16.45) (31.30) (29.74) (33.64) (11.31) 
Stage 2 0.959*** 0.139***   0.905*** 1.048*** 0.955*** 0.144*** 0.957*** 1.788*** 
 
(25.15) (5.092)   (18.96) (22.20) (24.10) (5.31) (25.00) (13.04) 
Stage 3 1.026*** 0.922***   1.054*** 0.997*** 1.114*** 1.032*** 1.002*** 1.011*** 
 
(19.41) (15.62)   (13.01) (14.55) (18.34) (15.81) (13.72) (51.89) 
Stage 4         1.009*** 0.134*** 
         (14.70) (4.927) 
Stage 5         1.559*** 0.887*** 
         (3.514) (15.28) 
Reg’l p/ty (t-1)            
Stage 1 -0.0255*** -0.0185*** -0.0416*** -0.0222*** -0.0391*** -0.0123*** -0.0297*** -0.0569*** -0.0254*** -0.0723*** 
 
(-3.624) (-6.408) (-4.243) (-7.163) (-3.872) (-3.671) (-3.388) (-8.951) (-3.576) (-9.762) 
Stage 2 -0.00685 -0.117*** -0.0241*** -0.114*** -0.01000 -0.0535*** -0.0143** -0.1205*** -0.0072 0.0058 
 
(-1.221) (-25.75) (-3.602) (-25.59) (-1.610) (-16.44) (-2.438) (-26.237) (-1.271) (1.068) 
Stage 3 0.00944*** -0.00238 0.00209 -0.00322 0.00852** -0.0153*** 0.00045 -0.0072** 0.0102* -0.0207*** 
 
(3.208) (-0.872) (0.528) (-1.144) (2.138) (-3.952) (0.089) (-2.522) (1.887) (-5.539) 
Stage 4         0.0171*** -0.1174*** 
         (2.728) (-25.86) 
Stage 5         -0.0236 -0.0022 
         (-1.641) (-0.818) 
Year FE 1.90* 22.94*** 18.99*** 35.67*** 1.55* 5.24*** 2.06*** 24.01*** 1.96** 22.85*** 
Stages FE 11.80*** 254.54*** 12.24*** 223.72*** 10.50*** 53.12*** 6.10*** 241.38*** 6.24** 141.56*** 
Country FE       1.96** 24.90***   
Constant 0.0344*** 0.0587*** 0.0935*** 0.0833*** 0.0481*** 0.0364*** 0.0550*** 0.2175*** 0.0346*** 0.219*** 
 
(3.092) (5.993) (6.180) (7.975) (3.235) (3.121) (2.932) (9.080) (3.075) (9.738) 
Observations 3,173 20,402 3,176 20,402 2,466 14,114 3,137 20,402 3,173 20,402 
R-squared 0.550 0.254 0.160 0.172 0.458 0.170 0.554 0.275 0.551 0.272 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics in parentheses (using the Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993 correction). The FE rows report F-statistics for the 
joint significance of the corresponding fixed-effects. *, ** and *** show significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
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In contrast, the results for the EU15 sample produce a U-shaped trajectory of convergence 
with a very large and statistically very strong convergence coefficient in stage 2 and an 
insignificant but still negative coefficient in stage 3. Quite clearly, the results do not support 
the RKC hypothesis or any of the processes sketched out in our discussion of section 4.1. 
Rather, they seem to be more consistent, broadly speaking, with the non-linear 
convergence/polarisation paths found (but under different specifications and measures of 
inequality) in the studies of Ezcurra and Pascual (2007) and Petrakos et al (2011).  
The overall thrust of these trajectories is repeated consistently across alternative 
specifications.13 When we exclude the national growth variable (setting z1
S=0) the path 
towards divergence in the CEE appears slower but is certainly in the same direction, while 
the EU15 results do not change. When we restrict our estimating samples to a shorter time-
span, to exclude the turbulent years at the beginning and the end of the period, the CEE 
result is exactly as in the original model, while in the EU15 the convergence coefficient in 
stage 3 becomes significant. Similarly minor are the differences when we introduce country-
specific fixed effects (cols.5-6).  
In the last part of Table 2 we report the results from our more refined (but asymmetric) 5-
stage classification. As can be seen, some of the earlier results concerning especially the CEE 
sample apply in the same way in this specification. As before, the significance of the national 
growth variable drops continuously as we move to higher stages of development.14 Similarly, 
convergence is strongest in stage 1 and it gradually loses significance, turning to statistically 
significant divergence by stage 4 (in line with, but more emphatically than, what was found 
in col.1), while the estimate for stage 5 suggests a return towards convergence, although this 
is not statistically significant. In contrast, in the EU15 sample the 5-stage classification 
produces a convergence trajectory that is qualitatively very different than before. Between 
stages 1 and 4, the convergence coefficient follows a very clear hump-shaped path, 
becoming very strongly negative in stage 4 (which corresponds to stage 2 in col.1). In stage 
5, however, the direction of the path reverses and the convergence coefficient becomes 
insignificant. This result, which is directly comparable to the one obtained in col.1 under 
stage 3, explains our earlier inference concerning a U-shaped convergence trajectory in the 
EU15. We depict visually these convergence-divergence trajectories in Figure 4. 
                                                 
13
 The results are also consistent across alternative estimation methods, including the GLS random 
effects and PCSE estimators.  
14
 In the EU15 sample this applied less strongly in the three-stage classification and does not seem to 
apply at all here.  
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Figure 3. Convergence intensities across stages of development  
 
Notes: Convergence coefficients (setting equal to zero if not statistically significant) obtained 
from Table 2, cols.9-10. Fitted lines are based on a third-order polynomial.   
 
5. Discussion 
There are two key points of departure for the analysis in this paper. On the one hand, that 
owing to processes of transition and integration, regional disparities in the CEECs increased 
substantially over the last two decades and regional productivities and incomes became 
significantly polarised. On the other, that the traditional approach to the analysis of these 
developments is rather limiting, as it pays little attention to the national-development 
context – while the two main theories typically tested on the data seem to provide 
contradictory results. Reflecting especially on this second point, this paper attempted to 
provide a link, both theoretically and empirically, between national development and the 
process of regional growth and convergence. Our results provide clear evidence in support 
of the assertion that the convergence process – and regional growth more generally – is 
significantly different across different levels/stages of development. The evidence obtained, 
across the two samples, is at least partly consistent with our adapted RKC story.  
In the CEE, regional growth seems to follow a process broadly in line with our theoretical 
predictions: starting from convergence, divergence gradually emerges as we move to higher 
levels of development. The absence of a (statistically significant) ‘return to convergence’ at 
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the highest stage is consistent with our assertion that transition may be favouring 
centripetal forces against the tendency for speedier convergence at higher levels of 
development. Although of course we cannot exclude the possibility that this result may 
simply reflect that the CEECs have not yet reached the levels of national development 
needed to (re-)mobilise regional convergence15, it should be noted that at comparable levels 
of development (stage 1 for the EU15 sample) the EU15 regions were converging fast – 
admittedly within a very different political-economic context – and thus the level of 
development per se does not appear in itself as a sufficient explanation for the absence of a 
return to convergence. If we were to speculate on the factors that may explain this variation, 
quite naturally our attention would fall on the processes of post-communist transition and 
market integration/liberalisation that followed – in line with discussions elsewhere in the 
literature as reviewed briefly in the early parts of section 2.  
For the EU15, the evidence concerning the RKC hypothesis is more mixed. On the one hand, 
at very low to medium levels of national development (stages 1-4) we do observe a path that 
is similar to the one described by the RKC (Fig.4). However, in no stage of development do 
we get convincing (statistically significant) evidence of divergence – which would be more in 
line with the RKC hypothesis. Moreover, we find that even at higher levels of development 
the convergence coefficient is not stable but rather tends to reverse. While this, too, is not 
part of the original RKC hypothesis, the overall convergence path depicted in Fig.4 is in fact 
broadly consistent with our theoretical discussion of section 4.1. Using this discussion to 
interpret the evolution of the convergence coefficient in the EU15, we could hypothesise 
that in this group technological (or other) shocks pushing towards divergence have a higher 
frequency but lower intensity. Thus, episodes of slower and faster convergence alternate, 
with more advanced regions occasionally increasing their distance from the less well-off 
regions, but without reversing the overall pattern of convergence (presumably, amongst the 
latter group of regions).  
Moving beyond these interpretations, we wish to conclude by relating the main message 
emanating from our analysis, namely the existence of a strong link between national 
economic context and the process of regional convergence, to related arguments in the 
literature. As discussed earlier, a presumed link between national development and aspects 
of regional disparity has been suggested not only by Williamson’s (1965) regional Kuznets 
                                                 
15
 This could be in line with Gennaioli et al (2013) who claim that convergence occurs faster in more 
developed countries with better infrastructure and greater factor mobility. Note, however, that this 
prediction does not get support in the EU15 sample which represents higher levels of development.  
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curve but also in more recent contributions (Ezcurra and Pascual, 2007). However, no study 
has examined thus far, in a systematic way, the differentiation and non-linearity of the speed 
of convergence across different stages of economic development. A small number of 
empirical studies have showed that convergence speeds differ at different stages in the 
process of economic integration and over different national growth regimes (e.g., Tondl, 
1997; Geppert and Stephan, 2008). The model recently developed by Gennaioli et al (2013), 
and the empirical evidence presented there, added a different perspective, suggesting that 
the speed of convergence increases linearly with economic development. The evidence 
presented in this paper is in the same spirit as these observations. Like others, we find that 
the speed of convergence is not constant over time. But we also offer unique evidence 
showing that its evolution follows a rather deterministic path and is non-linear. We defer to 
future research the pursuit of a more detailed analysis of the factors explaining this.  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A.1. Regional disparities within and across the European countries 
Country Disparity (CoV) Polarisation Persistence 
Period 
Early 
transition 
Post accession 
Early 
transition 
Post accession Early - Post 
BG 0.22 0.26 1.73 2.08 0.38 
CZ 0.09 0.21 1.26 1.78 0.30 
EE 0.21 0.35 1.51 1.91 1.00 
HU 0.17 0.24 1.67 1.72 0.22 
LT 0.18 0.26 1.31 1.59 0.83 
LV 0.38 0.52 1.55 2.68 0.49 
PL 0.27 0.28 1.69 1.99 0.89 
RO 0.19 0.23 1.34 1.95 0.59 
SI 0.16 0.11 1.37 1.19 0.90 
SK 0.17 0.21 1.43 1.45 0.33 
CEE 0.44 0.55 2.82 2.82 0.63 
AT 0.16 0.15 1.31 1.30 0.85 
BE 0.13 0.13 1.34 1.40 0.86 
DE 0.23 0.16 2.07 2.37 0.66 
DK 0.10 0.08 1.20 1.15 0.61 
ES 0.14 0.08 1.27 1.22 0.65 
FI 0.09 0.14 1.23 1.42 0.90 
FR 0.14 0.16 1.68 2.17 0.82 
GR 0.54 0.30 3.45 1.96 0.05 
IE 0.15 0.23 1.31 1.46 0.81 
IT 0.12 0.12 1.21 1.31 0.79 
MT 0.16 0.07 1.11 1.05 1.00 
NL 0.15 0.17 1.61 1.56 0.76 
PT 0.26 0.30 1.67 2.00 0.96 
SE 0.06 0.09 1.14 1.30 0.31 
UK 0.13 0.17 1.46 1.65 0.46 
EU15 0.25 0.23 2.18 2.40 0.64 
Notes: Early transition covers the period 1990-1995; post-accession is for 2004-2008. Comparative 
data are presented for the same periods for the EU15.  
 
